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AGENCY
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
The agency decisions during the Survey period all repre-
sent sound applications of long settled rules of law to pre-
dominantly factual situations.
I. Master's Liability for Servants' Torts
Nature of the Servant's Negligence. Wineglass v. McMinn1
well illustrates the doctrine that a master is liable when his
servant, acting in the course of employment, leaves a ma-
chine or other instrumentality under such circumstances that
harm is likely to result to third persons. 2 In this case, a
truck driver went off on a personal errand, leaving a truck
in charge of an "unlicensed and inexperienced" fourteen-year-
old boy.3 Meanwhile, the driver of a parked car, apparently
wedged in by the truck, demanded that the truck be moved.
The boy, after unsuccessfully trying to locate the driver, at-
tempted to move the truck himself. In so doing, he injured
the plaintiff's person and car. Affirming the verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff against the owner of the truck, the
court concluded, without discussion, that "the acts of [the
truckdriver] . . . were in the scope of his employment,"4 a
statement which presumably includes (1) the truckdriver's
leaving the truck to go on a personal mission, while (2) the
truck remained in the boy's custody. As to (1), it is settled
that, if the leaving of the instrumentality is within the scope
of employment, the purpose for which the truck is left -
even though it is a personal frolic of the servant - does not
immunize the master from liability.5 This proposition, no-
where expressly declared in the opinion, is implicit in the
decision, and represents perhaps the only aspect in which
the case goes beyond its earlier ruling, under like circum-
stances, in Pfaehler v. Ten Cent Taxi Co.6 As to (2) the
Court refused to decide whether the master should be liable for
the young boy's wrongful acts "under the doctrine of re-
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 235 S. C. 537, 112 S. E. 2d 652 (1960).
2. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 240 (1958) especially at Comment (b).
3. 235 S. C. at 540, 112 S. E. 2d at 654.
4. Id. at 541, 112 S. E. 2d at 654.
5. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 240 (1958).
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spondect superior,"7 viz. whether the boy became a servant
or sub-servant of the master, although it recognized liability
for a helper's acts "at least under some circumstances" not
specified." The essence of the decision, therefore, is the serv-
ant's negligent or improper act in allowing the boy to have
custody of the truck. For this the master is liable. The facts
as to the lad's youth and inexperience bear upon the servant's
negligence in leaving the truck under such circumstances.
Given the boy's inexperience, the keys in the ignition, and
a crowded street, the event which in fact occurred was pre-
cisely the kind of happening which a reasonable person could
foresee.
Course of Employment. The course of employment issue,
which was not in terms discussed in the Wineglass case, was
the express basis for decision in Bolin v. Bostic.9 There the
Court reversed a verdict and judgment against a master for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an accident with an
employee assumed by the Court to be a servant,10 but found,
on that assumption, not to be acting within the course of
his employment. The employee, previously trained by the
master as a sewing machine salesman, furnished his own car
and transportation expenses, was subject to no hours or
territory requirements, and received commissions; he was
required to report at the master's place of business each
morning at 8:00 before starting work. On his way there,
he negligently caused the accident for which the injured
plaintiff sued the master. The Court applied the "general
rule" that an employee using his car in going to and from
work is not "engaged in work for his master" absent "special
circumstances" which were found to be not present on these
7. 235 S. C. at 541, 112 S. E. 2d at 654. Thus, the court did not have
to consider the significance of the fact (Id. at 539, 112 S. E. 2d at 653) that
the truckdriver "[wiith the knowledge and without objection of [the
master]" had "employed and paid" the boy "as a helper, who would assist
... with the truckdriver's deliveries."
8. Ibid.
9. 235 S. C. 319, 111 S. E. 2d 557 (1959). The court said that this
was the first time the issue had been "directly before us." Id. at 323, 111
S. E. 2d at 559.
10. The court refused to decide whether the servant was "an agent or
independent contractor," but "[a]ssumed that the relationship between
Bostic and him was that of principal and agent or master and servant
.... " Bolin v. Bostic, 235 S. C. at 322, 111 S. E. 2d at 558.
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facts." Even though there was nothing to bar the salesman
from making a sale prior to his 8:00 A.M. reporting time,
the Court concluded that he was not, in fact, acting within
the course of his employment, particularly since he had "no
intention of transacting any business on his way to work,"
and in view of the other facts showing his substantial inde-
pendence of action.' 2 Apart from the fact that the master
is not responsible for a servant's conduct on the way to and
from work, the Court seems quite correctly to have taken
the view that a bare possibility that the servant, at any time
of the day or night, might make a sale was not enough to
bring him into the "course of employment." A contrary
position would mean that the master was, in effect, the guar-
antor of the safety and integrity of all third parties at any
time the servant was driving his car, however personal the
activity, since, at any time, he could in theory also make a
sale.'1
Defenses Asserted by Master. Two cases between them
considered and applied all three common law defenses open
to a master sued for a servant's torts: contributory negli-
gence, assumed risk, and the fellow servant rule. The cases
turn upon their individual facts, and do not require extended
discussion. In Cooper v. Mayes,'4 assumed risk and con-
tributory negligence were successfully asserted by a'master
in bar of a claimed cause of action by a skilled, although as
the Court found, negligent electrician seriously injured in
falling from a ladder after cutting a live wire. In cutting
the wire, he assumed the risk that he would injure himself;
the fact that the owner of the property, "a layman unskilled
as to electricity," had assured the electrician that the wires
11. Id. at 324, 111 S. E. 2d at 559. Decisions holding the master liable
for servants' torts on the way to and from work include Helena Wholesale
Groc. Co. v. Bell, 195 Ark. 201, 70 P. 2d 416 (1938) (truck driver required
to make distant deliveries permitted to take truck home and keep it over-
night; master liable for accident on the way home); Cox v. Enloe, 50 Ariz.
201, 70 P. 2d 331 (1937) (truck driver allowed to go home before starting
emergency trip); Barber v. Jewel Tea Co., 252 App. Div. 362, 300 N. Y.
Supp. 302 (19375, afO'd, 278 N. Y. 540, 16 N. E. 2d 94 (1938) (employee
to do "homework" for employer). Contra S. & W. Contr. Co. v. Bugge, 194
Miss. 822, 13 So. 2d 645 (1943).
12. Bolin v. Bostic, 235 S. C. at 324-25, 111 S. E. 2d at 559-560.
13. Although the Court did not decide the servant vs. independent con-
tractor issue, the result of the case is in accordance with the present tend-
ency of courts not to hold traveling salesmen to be servants, although
there is a substantial number of cases precisely contra on the issue. Corn-
pare Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933), with Chatelain
v. Thackery, 98 Utah 525. 100 P.2d 191 (1940).
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were dead did not as a matter of law override the electrician's
presumably informed judgment as to the risk which he must
have known he was taking. 15 These and other facts conclu-
sively showed contributory negligence.
16
An illuminating dictum on one aspect of the master-servant
relation appears in Williams v. E. L DuPont de Nemours &
Co.,17 another "contributory negligence" case. There an ailing
employee, returning to his old job contrary to his physician's
advice and knowing that such work would likely impair his
health further, unsuccessfully sued the employer who, he
claimed, improperly refused his request for assignment to
less strenuous employment. The Court first noted that the
employee could have resigned his post as an alternative to
working at the only job which the employer could or would
assign him to. Economic compulsion to earn a living, even
when the employer furnishes only work which may be risky
from a health standpoint, "is not a compulsion by the em-
ployer or one for the consequences of which.. . the employer
may be held liable in damages."' 8 Unlike situations where
a protesting employee takes a job on the employer's assurance,
based on his "superior knowledge", of no health hazard 9
- a case where presumably the employer would be liable for
the employee's impaired health - the employee here was fully
aware of what he was doing and what it might do to him.
He was therefore said to be "contributorily negligent", or,
more accurately, to have assumed the risk of further injuring
his health.
The proper dimensions of the fellow-servant rule were at
issue in Lewis v. Trawick.20 Under its fact circumstances,
the Court concluded that the employee who had there injured
another employee was more than a fellow servant and in fact
15. Id. at 496, 109 S. E. 2d at 15.
16. Id. at 496-497, 109 S. E. 2d at 15.
17. 235 S. C. 497, 112 S. E. 2d 485 (1960)
18. Id. at 520, 112 S. E. 2d 485.
19. Ibid.
20. 234 S. C. 415, 108 S. E. 2d 680 (1959). The facts, briefly stated,
were that the master furnished free transportation to employees of its
sawmill, and that an employee given possession of the truck in which
the men were carried had an accident in which the plaintiff, another
employee of the same sawmill, was injured. The trial court had directed
a verdict for the master on the basis of the fellow servant rule. Id. at
417, 108 S. E. 2d at 680-681. The case was distinguished in Bolin v. Bostic
on the ground "the employer had assumed the obligation to transport the
employees to work, if they desired it, and furnished a truck and driver
for that purpose." 235 S. Q at 323, 111 S. E. 2d at 559.
1960]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1960], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss1/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
was "a representative of the master... performing the duties
of the master," so that his negligence "must be regarded
as the negligence of the master." 21 Current judicial disfavor
of the fellow servant rule, and corresponding widening of its
exceptions (as here), also support the result, the submitting
to the jury of the question of whether, in fact, the servant
was or was not a "fellow servant" for whose misconduct
the master was not liable. The Court correctly noted that
although two employees were both acting within the course
of their respective employments at the time, as they were
here, this did not "make them as a matter of law fellow serv-
ants within the fellow servant rule." 22
Family Purpose Doctrine. In Norwood v. Coley,2 plaintiff's
decedent was killed while driving with defendant's deceased
son in an automobile, the title to which, for financing pur-
poses, was in defendant's name, but which was paid for
entirely by the son who had its exclusive use. Reversing a
verdict and judgment for plaintiff, the Court held that these
facts were sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the
car was not for the "general convenience and use of the
family" and that the defendant's son was not an agent of
his father..2 4 In so ruling, the Court considered, in line with
decisions elsewhere, 25 that the mere fact that the supposed
"head of the family" owns the car is not of itself enough
to impose liability where, as here, the car was clearly not for
family use.26 This was strengthened rather than weakened
by the refusal of the bank which financed the car to dis-
count the papers from the son, a serviceman, and its in-
sistence that title be placed in the father.
II. Principal and Agent
Authority of Real Estate Brokers. Gallant v. Todd27 con-
tains a clear and comprehensive analysis of a typical printed
document furnished by real estate brokers to clients engaging
21. The quoted language (234 S. C. at 418, 108 S. E. 2d at 681) is from
opinions in Gunter v. Graniteville Mfg. Co., 18 S. C. 262, 270 (1882) and
Wilson v. Charleston & S. Ry., 51 S. C. 79, 96, 28 S. E. 91, 97 (1897).
22. Lewis v. Trawick, 234 S. C. at 420, 108 S. E. 2d at 682.
23. 235 S. C. 314, 111 S. E. 2d 550 (1959).
24. Id. at 318, 111 S. E. 2d at 552.
25. "There is no agency from mere ownership" for purposes of the
family car doctrine. Durden v. Maddox, 37 S. E. 2d 219 (Ga. App. 1946).
See also O'Keefe v. Fitzgerald, 106 Conn. 294, 137 Atl. 858 (1927) ; Red-
ding v. Barker, 33 Tenn. App. 132, 230 S. W. 2d 202 (1950).
26. Norwood v. Coley, 235 S. C. at 317, 111 S. E. 2d at 551.
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their services. Unlike the usual case, presenting the issue
in connection with the broker's suit for his unpaid commis-
sion, Gallant was a purchaser's suit to compel the defendant
to convey lands which the purchaser thought he was buying
through a real estate broker with full authority to make a
contract of sale. Defendant's plea and proof of no authority
in the broker was successful. The Court stressed the settled
canon of construction that such authorizations will be read
as authorizing only the presentment of a purchaser and not
a sale, unless that further power is unmistakeably clear from
the document. 28 This rule rests on the "practical reasons"
that any real estate sale involves considerably more than
just determination of the price, and these other aspects of
the transaction properly should be left to the seller and pur-
chaser personally unless there is clear contrary authority.29
The fact, several times noted in the opinion, 30 that the authori-
zation was a mere printed form with details filled in, was
apparently and rightly regarded as significant, and as bol-
stering the strict construction of the broker's authority.
Finally, despite the use several times in the printed form of
the terms "sell" and "sale" 31 customarily found in such
documents32 the Court recognized, in accordance with the
overwhelming line of authority,33 that "sell" does not mean
"sell" but "furnish a purchaser." Wharton V. Tolbert,31 which
pulls the other way, was distinguished and virtually con-
fined to its particular facts.
28. Id. at 431, 434, 111 S. E. 2d at 780, 782.
29. Id. at 431, 111 S. E. 2d at 781. Indeed, the contrary view would be
"dangerous doctrine." Edwards v. Coleman, 139 S. C. 369, 376, 138 S. E.
42, 44 (1927).
30. See, e.g., Gallant v. Todd, 235 S. C. at 430, 111 S. E. 2d at 780.
31. Id. at 431, 432, 111 S. E 2d at 780, 781.
32. "I hereby authorize [broker] to sell for me the below described
property of which I am owner, making them my sole agency for that pur-
pose, and in case sale of said property is made by them or by anyone else,
I do hereby contract and agree to pay them" the specified commission. Gal-
lant v. -Todd, 235 S. C. at 430, 111 S. E. 2d at 780 (emphasis supplied).
33. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY 2d § 53, comment (b) (1958); MECHEM,
AGENCY OUTLINES § 66 n. 10 (1952).
34. 84 S. C. 197, 65 S. E. 1056 (1909).
19601
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